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THE ARMSTRONG PRINCIPLE, THE NARRATIVES OF
TAKINGS, AND COMPENSATION STATUTES
WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR*
INTRODUCTION
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment' is famous for
inspiring disagreement. More than one hundred years have
passed since the Supreme Court departed from the original un-
derstanding of the clause and interpreted regulations as poten-
tially falling within its ambit.2 Although the passage of time has
established the principle that regulations can run afoul of the
Takings Clause, the Court has been unable to offer a coherent
vision of when compensation is required.' Academic commenta-
tors also have failed to reach agreement on the issue, offering an
enormous range of solutions to the takings question.4 The new-
* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. Earlier versions of this Essay were
presented at the Institute of Bill of Rights Law Symposium on Defining Takings:
Private Property and the Future of Government Regulation held at the College of
William & Mary School of Law on April 11, 1996 and at a Fordham Law School fac-
ulty colloquium. I am grateful to all the participants in those sessions for their help-
ful and stimulating comments, and I am particularly grateful to Lynda Butler and
Neal Deyins. I also thank Louise Halper, Jim Kainen, Bob Kaczorowski, Paul
Schwartz, Hank McGee, and John Nagle for their valuable suggestions and Frank
Michelman for his discussions about the Armstrong Principle and compensation stat-
utes. Fordham Law School generously provided research assistance for this project.
1. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894); William Mi-
chael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 791-97 (1995) (explaining that the original under-
standing of the Takings Clause included only physical seizures of property).
3. For an excellent synthesis of different tests employed by the Court, see Andrea
L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique
of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1299 (1989). For the leading deci-
sions after Professor Peterson's article, see Dolan u. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)
and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
4. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 810-18, 866-75 (listing and discussing academics'
differing treatments of the Takings Clause's original understanding and describing
1151
1152 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1151
est field of controversy involves compensation statutes.5 In a
few short years, the property rights movement's demand that
both state and national legislatures provide compensation when
government regulations diminish property value has won wide-
spread support, which, since 1994, has begun to translate into
legislative success.6 The Contract with America provides that
"property owners [are] to receive compensation ... for any re-
duction in the value of their property" greater than ten percent
Shortly after the 104th Session of the House of Representatives
began, its members passed an act requiring compensation when
certain regulations decreased the value of land by more than
twenty percent.' Five state legislatures have passed statutes
directing that property owners be paid for losses that they suffer
as the result of governmental regulations.9
The success of the property rights movement, however, has
provoked a powerful response. Academic criticism has been
sharp,10 and political opposition has been intense.1' Property
variations among Takings Clause public choice theories).
5. See infra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
7. Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, reprinted in CONTRACT WITH AMERI-
CA 134-35 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994).
8. Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 2.
9. Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, ch. 181, 1995 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. 1311 (West) (codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp.
1996)); Act of June 15, 1995, No. 302, 1995 La. Sess. Law Serv. 344 (West) (codified
at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3601-3602, 3608-3612, 3621-3624 (West Supp. 1996)); Mis-
sissippi Agricultural and Forestry Activity Act, 1995 Miss. Laws 379 (codified at
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1995)); Private Real Property Rights Pres-
ervation Act, ch. 517, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3266 (West) (codified at TEX. GoVT
CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-.006, .021-.026, .041-.045 (West Supp. 1996)); Private Proper-
ty Regulatory Fairness Act of 1995, ch. 98, 1995 Wash. Legis. Serv. 261 (West) (re-
pealed by referendum, Nov. 7, 1995).
10. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, A Skeptical View of "Property Rights" Legisla-
tion, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409 (1995) (critiquing H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995)
and S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995)). H.R. 925, which was passed by the House in
March, 1995, would compensate property owners if specified government action de-
valued their property by 20% or more. Id. at 409-10. S. 605, which was introduced
in the Senate on March 23, 1995, would compensate property owners in the event
specified government action devalued their property by 33% or more. Id. at 401, 417
n.36. See also Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public
Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 293 (1996)
(arguing that property rights legislation "could seriously disrupt the balancing effort
of takings jurisprudence").
11. See, e.g., David Postman, Property-Rights Measure Draws Big Contributors on
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rights legislation already has been repealed by referendum in
Washington state2 and rejected in an Arizona referendum. 3
President Clinton has threatened to veto any federal property
rights bill. 4 Opponents of compensation statutes accurately
have seen in both the proposed and enacted statutes a direct
threat to the continued existence of the regulatory state: by
requiring compensation for regulations these statutes will make
the imposition of many regulations too costly.
Given the extraordinary diversity of opinion about when com-
pensation is owed, it would be only natural to expect that an
equal lack of agreement would exist about what purpose the
Takings Clause serves. The reality, however, directly contradicts
that expectation. Justice Black crisply stated his view of the
purpose of the Takings Clause in Armstrong v. United States:5
The Takings Clause is "designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 6 Justice
Black's view has received a remarkable degree of assent across
the spectrum of opinion." The Armstrong principle has become,
according to Professor Glynn Lunney, a part of the "ritual lita-
ny" employed in takings decisions. 8 The principle has been em-
braced repeatedly by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justice
Scalia, the judicial champions of a broad reading of the Takings
Clause,' as well as Florida's compensation statute.2" It is con-
Both Sides of Fight, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 27, 1995, at Al (listing groups and individ-
uals contributing to the fight against Washington state's property rights referendum).
12. See Recent Legislation, 109 HARV. L. REV. 542, 543 n.5 (1995).
13. See Washington State Voters, Arizonans Agree on 'Takings, PHOENIX GAZETrE,
Nov. 20, 1995, at B1.
14. See Property Wrongs, NEW REPUB.LIC, June 17, 1996,. at 8.
15. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
16. Id. at 49.
17. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
18. Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH.
U. L. REv. 721, 747 (1993).
19. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
writing for the majority); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9 (1988)
(Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the majority); id. at 19 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4
(1987) (Scalia, J., writing for the majority); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 512-13 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
20. Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act, FLA. ANN. STAT. §
1997] 1153 '
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1151
tained specifically in the text of, and invoked in support of, vari-
ous property rights proposals recently introduced in the Sen-
ate.2' The champions of a narrow reading of the clause, Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens have espoused the
Armstrong principle with equal fervor.22
At one level, this striking unanimity results from Justice
Black's broad language. His language avoids confrontation of the
hard question: What do fairness and justice require? People with
very different ideas about fairness can accept the Armstrong
principle while diverging sharply as to what it means. Nonethe-
less, cultural conventions exist to give the principle meaning.
Bruce Ackerman has offered the leading scholarly treatment
of cultural conventions concerning the Takings Clause in his
book Private Property and the Constitution.' Ackerman devel-
ops what the Takings Clause means to "Layman"' by examin-
ing "Ordinary language" ' in order to reveal what would "be
called takings in ordinary life."28 He argues that Layman un-
derstands the word "property" to refer, most fundamentally, to
tangible, physical possessions and the word "take" to refer, most
fundamentally, to physical seizures. Thus, when the govern-
ment physically seizes his property and uses it for some purpose,
70.001(3)(e) (West Supp. 1996).
21. See 141 CONG. REC. S10037 (daily ed. July 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Gramm); id at S4504 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at
S4497 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); id. at S567 (daily ed. Jan.
6, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at S391 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Hatch).
22. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 608 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
writing for the majority); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 106 n.15 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J., writing for the majority); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1,
14 n.23 (1984) (Marshall, J., writing for the majority); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Webb's Fabu-
lous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163 (1980) (Blackmun, J., writing
for the majority); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24 (Brennan, J., writing for the ma-
jority); National Bd. of YMCA's v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 89 (1969) (Brennan,
J., writing for the majority).
23. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 113-67 (1977).
24. See id. (discussing "Layman's Things").
25. Id. at 129.
26. Id. at 139.
27. See id. at 123-36.
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Layman would say that his property has been taken. Similarly,
using "standard English," Layman would also describe his prop-
erty as having been taken when the government destroys it." s
Finally (and most problematically), when government renders
something useless, Professor Ackerman argues that Layman
again would say that that thing has been taken from him be-
cause "the principal point of property talk is to permit Layman
to identify some things in his environment that he may exploit
to his advantage without incurring adverse social sanction."29
To say that an individual still owns something that no longer
has any value is to "exhibit[ ] either a bad sense of humor or a
complete ignorance of the point of property-talk in American
society."
30
Ackerman's primary analytic tool is linguistic. Rather than
drawing on any empirical data indicating when lay people be-
lieve property has been taken and compensation owed, he focus-
es on what the relevant terms mean in everyday speech. The
claims he makes have an intuitive appeal: they seem to capture
common understanding. Moreover, the categories of situations
he identifies as being ones in which the layperson believes her
property to have been taken--ones in which the property is
physically seized, or destroyed, or stripped of all value-are the
ones that courts treat as easy cases for compensation (even
though scholars often disagree with this result).31 Judicial prac-
tice thus supports the existence of cultural conventions.
In this Essay, I argue that there is an additional category of
cases in which there is a cultural convention that fairness re-
quires compensation. This category consists of cases in which
unanticipated regulations destroy a significant portion of the
total assets of a property owner. From a legal vantage point,
these cases are very different from those situations Ackerman
discusses: courts will not necessarily order payment to be made
to these property owners nor will they necessarily invalidate the
28. Id. at 130.
29. Id. at 140.
30. Id.
31. Indeed, one of the central points of Ackerman's book is that there is a gap in the
takings realm between the lay perspective, which is reflected in much of the case law,
and the views of "sophisticated judges and lawyers of the present day." Id. at 168.
1997] 1155
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regulations. Courts will not always order compensation because
judicial takings inquiries typically focus on the harm to the
property, not on the actual harm to the property owner. If a reg-
ulation equally affects the value of Blackacre and Whiteacre,
courts will analyze the cases of the owners of Whiteacre and
Blackacre identically. The courts will treat the cases in similar
fashion even if the owner of Whiteacre also owns many other
properties that are not affected by the regulation, and the owner
of Blackacre owns nothing else and thus is deprived of most of
the value of her total assets by the regulation.
As a matter of constitutional interpretation and the institu-
tional role of the courts, this result is the correct one. The fact
that courts will not direct compensation, however, does not
mean that legislatures should not provide it. In this Essay, I
argue for compensation statutes at the state and national level
designed to ensure compensation in the final category of cases
described above, those in which the total net worth of a property
owner is dealt a disproportionate blow as a result of a newly
instituted government regulation.
At the outset, the limited goals of this Essay should be made
clear. It is an initial, but admittedly partial, attempt to sketch
out a new kind of compensation statute. It begins from the twin
premises that takings law and compensation practices should
reflect the Armstrong principle-the principle that individuals
should not bear an unfair share of public burdens-and that this
principle should be substantiated through cultural conventions.
In other words, I start from the assumption that compensation
is due in at least those cases in which there is a consensus that
it should be provided and then offer a model compensation stat-
ute designed to provide compensation in those cases. My claim is
not that there are no additional cases in which compensation
should be paid; only that compensation statutes should, at a
minimum, cover this category of cases. Neither will I attempt to
offer a full defense of the legitimacy of these premises. They
seem to me, however, to be obviously correct. A democratic gov-
ernment should not treat its citizens in a way that is generally
thought to be unfair.32
32. The view that takings law should reflect cultural conventions is one that has
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The enterprise of this Essay is important, in part, for pruden-
tial reasons. Though critics of the property rights movement's
compensation statutes effectively have revealed a range of those
statutes' shortcomings,"3 they have not offered an alternative
vision for what compensation statutes should look like. As a
political matter, this is a mistake. The absence of an alternative
makes the property rights movement's proposals significantly
more attractive to many people. Although many individuals may
find these statutes too broad, the statutes offer the only mecha -
nism available to help those who, despite being greatly harmed
by regulation, have no hope of judicial redress. My proposal
seeks to remedy unfairness without simultaneously making reg-
ulation impossible.
In addition, statutes of the kind I propose here are necessary
if the Takings Clause is to reach its appropriate role in the con-
stitutional framework. In the past few years, process theories
about the Takings Clause have achieved prominence in scholarly
debates regarding the clause.' These theories are, to quote
Professor James Krier, the "latest fad in the field."35 Most pro-
ponents of process theories (myself included) believe that courts
should defer to the decisions made by the majoritarian political
process about regulation and compensation, except in those cas-
es in which reason exists to suspect process failure.36 In focus-
ing on the judicial role, however, process theorists have not
offered a complementary theory laying out an appropriate
framework for majoritarian decisionmakers' compensation deter-
important support in the scholarly literature. In particular, it lies at the heart of
the approaches of Professors Fischel and Ellickson. See WLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGU-
LATORY TAKINGs (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Econom-
ic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 416-424 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Property Wrongs, supra note 14.
34. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 32; Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Com-
pensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 279 (1992); Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and
Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285 (1990); Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts and Spe-
cial Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333 (1991); Glyan S. Lunney Jr., A Critical Reexami-
nation of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1892 (1992); Marc R. Poirier,
Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public Choice on the Beach Front, 46 RUTGERS
L. REV. 243 (1993); Treanor, supra note 2.
35. James E. Krier, Takings from Freund to Fischel, 84 GEO. L.J. 1895, 1908
(1996) (book review) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra note 32).
36. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 2, at 784, 855-78.
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minations. My proposal here represents an effort to start filling
that gap.
The project of the Essay, then, is two-fold: to demonstrate the
current consensus and to develop the case for a new kind of com-
pensation statute. To demonstrate the current consensus, I start
with a surprising (because partisan) source: the narratives told
by proponents of the property rights movement.
NARRATIVES OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT
The property rights movement derives its political strength
from the power of its stories. As the National Review has ob-
served, "[T]he real impetus for the property-rights movement is
outrage at specific cases of government abuse of landowners. " "7
Those stories of abuse are almost formulaic. Thus, Representa-
tive Billy Tauzin, the chief sponsor of one leading proposal, of-
fers what one environmentalist has dubbed "the favorite 'horror
story' of Endangered Species Act (ESA) opponents."38
This insanity came to a head last year during the California
brush fires. Many people watched in dismay as their homes
burned down because they were not allowed to dig around
them and create fire breaks. Why? Because the US Fish and
Wildlife Service summarily and arbitrarily determined that
such precautions would disturb the habitat of the kangaroo
rat. Imagine that. A rat!39
Representative Tauzin tells another prominent horror story
featuring the Army Corps of Engineers as the wrong-doers:
37. Jonathan H. Adler, Takings Cause, NATL REV., Dec. 19, 1994, at 32, 35.
38. Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth Amendment: The Legislative Backlash
Against Environmentalism, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 637, 644 (1995) (citing GAO De-
bunks Endangered Species 'Horror Story", BUS. WIRE, July 14, 1994 (quoting Michael
Bean, Chair of Environmental Defense Fund wildlife program), available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnews File).
39. Wolf, supra note 38, at 644 (citing W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, 'If You Take It, Pay
For It!': Something's Wrong When a Rat's Home Is More Important Than an
American's Home, ROLL CALL, July 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File; W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Private Property & Public Rights, CHRISTIAN Sc.
MONITOR, Aug. 15, 1994, at 19).
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[T]he Chaconases ... bought their home from a family called
the Gautreaus. The Gautreaus built their home. They built it
first checking with the Corps of Engineers to see if it was all
right to dig a pond and to use the material from the pond as
a foundation for the home. The Corps said, "No problem."
They built the home. Then they built another home across
the street and sold that first home as an investment to the
Chaconases. Oh, but guess what happened in the meantime.
The Corps of Engineers showed up because some neighbor
did not like the drainage situation in the area and reported
him to the EPA.
Mr. Chairman, the Corps of Engineers showed up and said
to the Chaconases, new owners, "You may have to take down
part of your home because it's built on a wetland," and the
Chaconases said, "What's going on here? Did anybody notice
me before I bought this home that it was a wetland?" The
answer was no.
[The Chaconases and the Gatreaus subsequently learned
from the Corps of Engineers that the road to both their
homes crossed a wetland and could not be used. Gautreau
asked a government official how he could continue to use his
home.] And that official of this U.S. Government who is paid
by the taxes that Mr. Gautreau spends each year, sends to
this Government, has the arrogance, the audacity, to tell that
man, "Take a helicopter. You want to get home after noon,
after work, you've sweated and toiled and sent your tax dol-
lars to this government, take a helicopter because we're tak-
ing your road."0
Representative Jack Fields offers another narrative that
scholar Michael Allan Wolf describes as a "morality tale [that] is
a favorite among opponents of the ESA."4'
In Maryland, a couple was prohibited from preventing ero-
sion on their property because the government told them that
it might destroy tiger beetles. Meanwhile, a fifteen-foot sec-
tion of their property plunged into the bay. Their home is
now the endangered species.42
40. 141 CONG. REc. H2544 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
41. Wolf, supra note 38, at 646.
42. Id. at 645-46 (citing 140 CONG. REC. E225 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1994) (statement
1997] 1159
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In its discussion of abusive government regulations, the recent
Senate Report on the leadership's proposed property rights stat-
ute concludes with the following dramatic example:
Bob and Mary McMackin of Pennsylvania obtained all the
necessary permits to go ahead and build a house on their
property. They did just that and lived in that house for 4
years. Then, they were informed that their seemingly dry
land had been designated a wetland and that they faced
criminal sanctions and staggering fines.
43
Howard Burris's tale of woe anchored pieces championing the
property rights movement in the National Review, Forbes, and
the Washington Times. The National Review's account of Mr.
Burris's fate ran as follows:
Howard Burris of Travis County, Texas,... spent 15 years
and millions of dollars developing some land his family had
owned since World War II. Then, four years ago, Mr. Burris
received a cease-and-desist order from the Fish and Wildlife
Service because his land was identified as suitable habitat for
the golden-cheeked warbler. "I was in a box," he says. He was
unable to continue development or to make any other produc-
tive use of the land. As a result, the bank foreclosed on near-
ly 400 acres. "I'm not at all opposed to protecting endangered
species," says Mr. Burris, "just to giving up my net worth to
do it.""
Speaker Gingrich offered the following explanation of his sup-
port of the property rights movement, as well as the broader
support the movement had attracted:
Part of what happened was people had family ranches that
were three and four generations old, they suddenly had a
of Rep. Fields)).
43. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 15 (1996).
44. Adler, supra note 37, at 32, 35. For other accounts of Burris's attempt to develop
this land, see Jonathan Adler, Property Rights Revolt, WASH. TIMES, July 16, 1994, at
D1; Leslie Spencer, No Dream House for Mr. Burris, FORBES, July 18, 1994, at 78.
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bureaucrat show up from Washington and say, I now control
how you live on your family property. You can't take me to
court, you will not get compensated but I've just changed to
[sic] total value of your family inheritance. And people got
into a rage. And across all of the West, in particular, you
have people who are just enraged by the way in which
they've been dealt with by government bureaucracies....
[The Private Property Rights Act] is an effort to begin to re-
balance...
These various accounts share a number of common features.
In each case, the property owners are innocent actors. Not only
are they not doing anything harmful, they simply are seeking to
do what they have every reason to believe they would be permit-
ted to do: build a home, set up a fire barrier, prevent their home
from falling into the sea, develop property in accordance with
long-standing plans, or live on the family ranch. The
government's decisions seem either to reflect irrational bureau-
cratic judgments or to ignore justifiable reliance: after the gov-
ernment permits home building, wetlands are discovered; the
protection of family homes loses out to tiger beetles and rats;
millions of dollars in investments are sacrificed to protect the
interests of golden-cheeked warblers; bureaucrats just "show up"
and start to "control how you live on your family property."46
The owner has a strong emotional investment in the affected
property.
Most of the cases involve homes. Strikingly, in the one case
involving property that is primarily an investment, the case of
Howard Burris, the author is careful to situate the property in a
family context: the property is described as "land his family had
owned since World War II."47 Most fundamentally, the proper-
ty owners appear to endure catastrophic personal harm. They
45. Rep. Newt Gingrich, Daily News Conference with House Speaker Newt
Gingrich,- Federal News Service, Mar. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File.
46. Gingrich, supra note 45.
47. Adler, supra note 37, at 32, 35.
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lose their homes.48 They lose their "net worth."49 The "total
value" of the family inheritance is "changed."" In other words,
the taking is described, not in abstract economic terms, but in
terms of devastation to an individual's total assets.
Property rights advocates do not narrate tales in which a reg-
ulation diminishes some small part of a giant corporation's di-
versified portfolio or some small part of a very wealthy
individual's diversified portfolio. Rather, they tell tales in which
an individual loses, if not everything, a large part of all that she
owns. The National Review observes: "A small landowner under
threat of losing her homestead is a more sympathetic victim than
a corporation concerned about a moderate decline in profits."5'
Representative Tauzin asserts that his "commitment to this issue
was born out of the horror stories that average, middle-class
landowners shared with me."52 It should be noted, however, that
not of all the victims in these accounts are actually middle class.
For example, someone who could invest "millions" in a plan for
development, as did Howard Burris, is not a member of the mid-
dle class. All of the individuals in these accounts do, however,
suffer drastic personal losses. The fact that Representative
Tauzin and the National Review, as well as other sources, de-
scribe these anecdotes as involving middle class victims reveals
what they believe makes these stories compelling. They are com-
pelling because the regulations threaten the economic well-being
of the property owners; the affected property is not so much an
investment as it is the core of the person's savings.
Supporters of the compensation statutes favored by the prop-
erty rights movement contend that the legislation is necessary
because the Supreme Court has underenforced the Takings
Clause.53 Professor James Ely, for example, has suggested that
48. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51. Adler, supra note 37, at 32, 35.
52. Wolf, supra note 38, at 641 (quoting Rep. Tauzin).
53. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S390 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("Judicial protection of property rights ... has been both inconsistent and
ineffective .... [Tihe Court has eschewed any set formula for determining how far
is too far, preferring to engage in ad hoc factual inquiries .. .).
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the legislation is an appropriate remedy for the Supreme Court's
failure to "put some teeth into the [Tiakings [Cllause."5 In put-
ting teeth into the clause, the statutes fix a percentage loss in
value that triggers an obligation to compensate."
Operating on a case-by-case basis, the Court has upheld regu-
lations that have decreased property values by more than seven-
ty-five percent."5 The property rights statutes that have been
proposed or enacted have lowered the trigger amounts signifi-
cantly. 7 For example, Washington State's statute, which subse-
quently was repealed by referendum, mandated compensation
when a regulation caused any loss in value. 8 The statute
passed in the House last term required compensation whenever
an agency action under the Clean Water Act,59 the ESA,. or
certain provisions of the Food Security Act of 198561 caused
land value to drop more than twenty percent.62 As these ex-
amples suggest, the various statutes enacted and proposals
offered (with the exception of the Florida statute) fall into one of
two categories. Either they provide that compensation is due
when any regulation diminishes the value of property by a cer-
tain percentage, or they provide that compensation is due when
regulations enacted pursuant to specified regulatory schemes di-
minish the value of certain forms of property by a certain per-
centage.'
At the same time proponents of the property rights movement
54. Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CANADI-
AN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 161, 162 n.10 (1996) (quoting Professor Ely).
55. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
56. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
57. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
58. See Private Property Regulation Fairness Act of 1995, ch. 98, § 4(2), 1995
Wash. Leg. Serv. 261, 261-62 (West) (repealed by referendum, Nov. 7, 1995).
59. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
60. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
61. Id. §§ 3801-3862.
62. See H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). For a close reading of the text of this
statute and a careful analysis of its provisions, see Michelman, supra note 10. The
state "property rights" statutes currently in effect have a trigger of between 20%
and 40%. See Recent Legislation, supra note 12, at 543 n.7.
63. See Recent Legislation, supra note 12, at 543 n.7. The Florida statute compen-
sates property owners "whenever government regulation infuses an 'inordinate
burden' on the ability of a landowner to use her property." Id at 543.
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have sought to establish threshold figures that make a regula-
tion give rise to a taking, the underlying concerns embodied in
their narratives are in large part concerns recognized by the
Court as relevant to a takings analysis.' The stories described
above involve situations in which the harm to the individual far
outweighs the benefit to society. One of the Court's standard
approaches, however, an approach that can be traced back to
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,' is a balancing test in which
individual harm is weighed against societal benefit.' Many of
the foregoing stories concern individuals whose property de-
clined in value after they invested in legitimate reliance upon
governmental authorizations or on a certain status quo.67 The
Court also has addressed such reliance. In Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City,' the Court recognized interfer-
ence "with distinct investment-backed expectations" as a factor
that can warrant a finding of a taking.69
There is, nevertheless, one factor featured in these narratives
that the Court does not treat as relevant: the extent to which
the regulation harms the property owner. Of course, the Court
attends to economic loss in its takings analysis. As Professor
Andrea Peterson has written in summarizing the various tests
applied by the Court, "the Court considers what proportion of
the original value of the land (or other tangible resources), has
been destroyed as a result of the challenged regulation."7 ° In
this regard, there is an ongoing dispute in the case law as to
whether the entire property or some sub-set of interests pertain-
ing to that property should be considered in determining wheth-
er the proportion destroyed is excessive.71 In all cases, however,
the Court focuses on the property, not on the person owning the
property. When Penn Central was blocked from using its air
64. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
65. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
66. See id. at 413-16.
67. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
68. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
69. Id. at 124.
70. Peterson, supra note 3, at 1325-26.
71. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1674-78 (1988) (discussing
conceptual severance).
1164
ARMSTRONG PRINCIPLE
rights over Grand Central Station,72 the question for the Court
was the magnitude of the government action's impact on the
property.73 Whether Penn Central owned many properties or
just this one was irrelevant to the analysis. All that mattered
was the "[economic] impact of the regulation on the Terminal
site."74 When the South Carolina Coastal Commission blocked
David Lucas's plans to develop two beach-front lots, no Justice
discussed whether the loss of the lots' value dramatically affect-
ed David Lucas's net worth or whether he was so wealthy that
the loss he suffered was, though grave, a manageable one from
his personal point of view.7" The narratives of takings, however,
suggest that adherents of the property rights movement care
deeply about the impact of government action on individuals'
overall well being, and that this affects their view of the fair
outcome. To make the point concretely: Assume two individuals,
both owning a lot worth $1 million. Jones has few other assets
and is planning to put her retirement home on the lot; Smith is
worth one billion dollars and the lot is part of a diversified port-
folio of economic investments. She plans to build a home on the
lot that she later will sell for a profit. An unanticipated regula-
tion comes into effect, limiting what can be built on the lots and
therefore lowering the value of each lot to $300,000. Under cur-
rent case law, Jones and Smith are situated identically, and,
probably, neither will receive compensation. Jones's situation,
however, is recognizably the kind of horror story that fuels the
property rights movement; Smith's is not.
Implicit in these narratives is a belief in the declining mar-
ginal utility of money. According to that theory, the more money
72. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107-31.
73. See id. at 136.
74. Id. The New York Court of Appeals had taken a different approach, analyzing
the regulation in the context of its effect, not just on Grand Central Station, but in
the context of all the "plaintiffs' heavy real estate holdings in the Grand Central ar-
ea." 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (1977). This approach, however, is at odds with the ap-
proach taken in Supreme Court case law and was specifically disapproved of by Jus-
tice Scalia in a footnote in his majority opinion in Lucas. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). Moreover, the New York Court of
Appeals analysis only considered property in the immediate area. It did not examine
the affect of the regulation in the context of Penn Central's total assets.
75. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
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that a person has, the less each new dollar means to her.76
Thus, $100,000 is a very different sum to a rich person than it is
to a middle class person. The narratives implicitly embrace this
view by focusing on the individual's pain, rather than her loss
viewed in purely economic terms, the diminution of a particular
property value.77 Representative Tauzin does not put a price
tag on the Chaconases' loss.7" What is important is that they
have lost their home. The property rights movement does not
focus on similar stories in which a large corporation suffers a
great loss with respect to one of the many lots that it owns.
Indeed, the stories reflect a personality theory of property, more
than a purely economic one. These properties are to be protected
because of the property owner's psychic investment in
them-they are in most cases the individual's home-rather
than a mere economic investment.
The property rights movement is fond of citing the Armstrong
principle.79 As has been noted it is explicitly invoked in a range
of current statutory proposals,' including Florida's compensa-
tion statute.8 Analysis of the narratives adds some substance
to the meaning of these broad appeals to fairness principles.
Regulations are most unfair when they substantially diminish
the value of investments that were made on the basis of legiti-
mate expectations and when that diminution works a great
hardship on the property owner. The particular situation of the
individual property owner thus is critical.
The responses to these accounts by opponents of the property
rights legislation are equally significant in ascertaining cultural
conventions concerning the limits of regulation. A number of
sharp critiques have been advanced.82 One response argues
that the narrative accounts are wrong or misleading, that they
are, to quote Professor Wolf, "faux horror stories."' Thus, Pro-
76. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 458 (4th ed. 1992).
77. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
83. Wolf, supra note 38, at 653.
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fessor Wolf argues that the Fish and Wildlife Service's acts on
behalf of the kangaroo rat did not cause houses to burn down."
A Washington Post article reprinted in the Congressional Record
emphasized the misleading nature of one story by reporting that
the Gautreaus were told that they needed a permit before build-
ing and that John Chaconas subsequently sued Roger Gautreaus
over the property sale.' Environmental lawyer Ray Vaughan
contends that it is extraordinarily rare for ESA to interfere with
a property owner's plans." A different response to the narra-
tives suggests that the real support for the property rights
movement lies with developers and big business, rather than
with affected individual property owners." Professor Frank
Michelman has critiqued effectively the proposed federal proper-
ty rights statutes as being either so broad as to violate our con-
stitutional understanding that individuals can be stopped from
using their property in a way that harms otherss or so nar-
row-providing compensation for only certain types of regula-
tions-as to be "pork-barrel legislation for a politically favored
but not otherwise deserving constituency."9 Others have criti-
cized whether the proposed legislation would even provide com-
pensation in the cases that have received so much attention.'
Although these critiques are telling, it is important to recog-
nize what is missing from them. No one suggests that, if the
events occurred in the way in which the property rights advo-
cates narrate them, then the property owners who have suffered
these losses deserve their fate. Although these critics of property
84. See id. at 644-45.
85. Tom Kenworthy, Truth Is Victim in Rules Debate-Facts Don't Burden Some
Hill Tales of Regulatory Abuse, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1995, at Al, reprinted in 141
CONG. REC. S4611 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1995).
86. See Ray Vaughan, State of Extinction: The Case of the Alabama Sturgeon and
Ways Opponents of the Endangered Species Act Thwart Protection for Rare Species,
46 ALA. L. REV. 569, 581 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Peter A. Berle, Private Property and Public Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 15, 1994, at 19. See also Property Wrongs, supra note 14, at 8 (de-
scribing the backers of the Senate property rights proposal as "mainly timber, min-
ing and grazing interests, along with real estate developers").
88. See Michelman, supra note 10, at 416.
89. Id. at 420.
90. See Wolf, supra note 38, at 642-50 (discussing disputes involving endangered
species).
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rights legislation may not have envisioned a Takings Clause
that would allow for (or require) compensation in these cases,
they nonetheless acknowledge that, if these stories were true,
then the property owners have been treated unfairly.91 These
critics have described Representative Tauzin's stories as "com-
pelling"92 and "moving."  "There is no question," Professor
Wolf writes, "that, upon hearing or reading these tales of woe,
[it] would be difficult for other politicians and their constituents
to be unmoved and unsympathetic."' "Some of the stories
would grab anyone," stated a report in the National Journal.95
This reaction is worth highlighting, because proponents of a
narrow reading of the Takings Clause generally are unsympa-
thetic to the economic losses suffered by the property owner as a
result of regulations. The property owner often is seen as deserv-
ing her fate because she engaged in harmful activity; under this
view, no one deserves compensation if she is prevented from
doing something fundamentally wrong. 6 Alternately, the regu-
lation is seen almost as a cost of doing business. A property
owner engages in certain activities. She always can anticipate
the possibility of increased government regulation and, in pur-
chasing property, gambles on what regulations subsequently will
issue. When a regulation is issued, she has lost, but she no more
deserves compensation than does the holder of a losing lottery
ticket.
97
The very different reaction to the property rights movement's
takings narratives, then, provides further evidence of a cultural
consensus about fairness in assigning burdens. When a regula-
tion substantially burdens an individual and the regulation was
not one that reasonably was foreseeable, we are sympathetic to
91. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
92. Bruce Alpert, Pair Disputes Tauzin's Tale of Wetland Woes, TIMES PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Apr. 12, 1995, at B4.
93. Kenworthy, supra note 85, at Al.
94. See Wolf, supra note 38, at 650.
95. Neal .R. Peirce, Takings-the Comings and Goings, NAT'L J., Jan. 6, 1996, at 37.
96. See John A. Humbach, Should Taxpayers Pay People To Obey Environmental
Laws?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 423, 428-32 (1995).
97. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional
Law: The Ideology of the Scientific Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 COLUM L. REV. 1545,
1552-55 & n.35 (1982) (discussing the utilitarian approach to takings compensation).
1168
ARMSTRONG PRINCIPLE
her plight. We are not sympathetic, however, to an individual
who suffers the exact same burden on a particular parcel of
property but who, because of her greater assets, is better pre-
pared to handle the loss. Fairness is contextual. When we talk
about "bar[ring] Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole,"98 fairness and justice are not
simply concerned with what harm is being prevented or how
widely the benefits of the regulations are spread. They also are
concerned with how well-equipped the individual in question is
to bear those burdens. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Lucas caught something of this point. He wrote:
Surely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when no
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted,
it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the
legislature is simply "adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life,". . . in a manner that secures an "average reci-
procity of advantage" to everyone concerned ..... And the
functional basis for permitting the government, by regulation,
to affect property values without compensation-that "Gov-
ernment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law," . . . does not apply to the
relatively rare situations where the government has deprived
a landowner of all economically beneficial uses.99
To the extent that Justice Scalia spoke of an individual piece
of property, the view that he took may well be incorrect. An indi-
vidual who owns enough properties can enjoy an "average reci-
procity of advantage" even if a regulation takes all value from
one piece of property. At the same time, an individual who owns
only one piece of property may be denied an "average reciprocity
of advantage" if a regulation substantially diminishes the value
of that property, even if some value remains. Nonetheless, Jus-
tice Scalia's opinion suggests that, in determining whether there
98. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
99. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992) (cita-
tions omitted).
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has been "reciprocity of advantage," it is appropriate to attend to
the idiosyncracies of the case and the actual effects of the regu-
lation on the individual. When an individual owns many proper-
ties, the benefits and burdens of regulation likely will even out.
A regulation may treat one parcel harshly, but other regulations
will benefit other properties. Overall, the individual is not being
treated unfairly. If she owns only the affected property, however,
she experiences regulatory burdens without experiencing, as an
individual, any direct regulatory benefits. We therefore are like-
ly to believe that she is being treated unfairly.
THE ARMSTRONG PRINCIPLE: FAiRNESS AS A GUIDING VALUE IN
TAKINGS LAW
Now, as I noted at the beginning of this Essay, there is a
broad consensus that takings law should reflect the Armstrong
principle,' 0 with its stricture against imposing on the individ-
ual burdens that, for reasons of fairness and justice, should be
shared generally. If we are committed to this principle, and if we
further accept that fairness should encompass cultural conven-
tions about what is fair, the question becomes the following:
How should takings law be shaped by our cultural convention
that it is unfair for an unforeseeable regulation to impose sub-
stantial burdens on an individual?
One approach would be that judicial construction of the Tak-
ings Clause should reflect this insight. For reasons I have devel-
oped in a previous article, however, I do not think that this ap-
proach is the appropriate one.' Part of the reason for its inap-
propriateness has to do with the original understanding of the
Takings Clause. If one takes a traditional approach to the appli-
cation of the original understanding, these regulations would not
give rise to a judicially-enforceable right to compensation. Under
the original understanding, compensation was mandatory only
for physical seizures, not regulations,"' and the TakingsClause was not, as a general matter, enforceable judicially. 03
100. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
101. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 791-97, 878-79, 883-85.
102. See id. at 798.
103. See id. at 791-97 & n.69.
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Congress had "the sole responsibility for paying takings claims
against the federal government."' An alternative originalist
approach, and one that I find more appealing, seeks to interpret
the clause in a way that advances the purpose that the clause
initially was meant to serve. This approach, however, yields the
same result with respect to the regulations featured in the prop-
erty rights narratives.
The original rationale behind the Takings Clause was to pro-
vide heightened protection for those who could not protect ade-
quately their property through the political process.' For ex-
ample, because supporters of the Takings Clause believed that
landowners and slaveowners would be peculiarly unable to enter
into winning political coalitions, the clause provided them with
the heightened protection that, were their property to be seized,
compensation would be due them.' If we are to be consistent
with the clause's original purpose, courts should protect only
those who are most vulnerable to process failure, the modern
analogues to late-eighteenth-century slaveowners and landown-
ers. Today, process failure is most likely to occur in cases in
which individuals or small groups are singled out and in cases
involving minority groups (as in the area of environmental rac-
ism)."0 7 Thus, heightened scrutiny is appropriate with respect
to regulations that affect individuals, small groups, or minori-
ties.'0 8 In contrast, the type of people featured in the narra-
tives of the property rights movement'°---middle class people
whose assets are primarily in one piece of property-can defend
themselves through the political process. In fact, the best evi-
dence of this is the strength of the property rights move-
ment." Of course, to the extent that a property owner is a vic-
104. See id. at 794 n.69; see also Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims
Against the United States: The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model
of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 637-48 (1985) (discussing congressional control of
claims in the early republic).
105. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 818-55.
106. See id. at 855.
107. See id. at 866-77.
108. See id. at 859-77. This portion of my argument was based on the translation model
developed in Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tax. L. REv. 1165 (1993).
109. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
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tim of process failure-such as by being singled out-she would
have a cause of action, but she would have no special cause of
action because the only property she owned was the one affected
by the regulation at issue.
Wholly apart from originalism, I have argued for a process-
based approach to the Takings Clause on the grounds that "it
reflects deference to majoritarian decisionmakers where it is
appropriate and a judicial check on them where it is neces-
sary.""' A process theory accords with the broader commit-
ments of our constitutional structure, under which the judiciary
defers to the majority except in those areas where majoritarian
decisionmaking is particularly unlikely to regard certain inter-
ests or actors fairly."' Again, the power of the property rights
movement suggests that these interests can defend themselves.
Regardless of whether one accepts a process-based theory of
the Takings Clause, however, it is difficult to see how one could
frame a theory of judicial construction of the clause that would
be sensitive to the peculiar effects of a regulation on an
individual's well-being. In other words, as I have argued, com-
mon notions of fairness cause us to view differently a regulation
that affects A, who has no other property than the one affected
by the regulation, and B, who has many properties, only one of
which is affected by the regulation. To say, however, that courts
should provide compensation to A in situations in which they
would not compensate B is to say that courts should construe
the Takings Clause in a way that discriminates against the
wealthy. Although a great range of theories surround the clause,
it is hard to see how it can be read to require courts to provide
the wealthy with less protection than others who suffer similar
losses."'
111. Treanor, supra note 2, at 887.
112. See id. at 882-84.
113. It should be noted that theories of the Takings Clause exist that would re-
quire compensation in the cases in which individuals are burdened substantially by
regulations. In particular, Professor Richard Epstein has taken the position that
'[aill regulations ... are takings of private property prima facie compensable by the
state." RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 95 (1985). Professor Epstein's theory, however, is
not one that is limited to situations in which cultural conventions dictate that fair-
ness requires compensation. As a result, it is inapposite to the question of whether
a construction of the Takings Clause could be framed that provides heightened pro-
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The significance of the clause is not, however, limited to what
courts construe it to require. Although James Madison, the
clause's author, wanted it to provide the basis for judicial re-
view, he wanted it also to serve the broader function of inform-
ing the political process by educating the public against illegiti-
mate redistribution."4 Even more strikingly, as pointed out
previously, the Takings Clause was limited almost wholly to the
political arena for its vindication. 5 For approximately the first
one hundred years of our nation's history, Congress essentially
barred the federal courts from adjudicating claims under the
Takings Clause."' Until Congress gave the Court of Claims ju-
risdiction over Takings Clause cases in 1887, "' compensation
was at Congress's discretion.' To date, Congress and state
legislatures provide compensation in situations in which there is
no constitutional obligation to do so.' Thus, Congress and
state legislatures clearly have the power to extend the compen-
sation principle beyond those circumstances in which courts can
(or should) order compensation in interpreting the clause.
If courts should not expand the Takings Clause to cover situa-
tions in which a regulation imposes an undue burden on an indi-
vidual property owner, then it seems that legislation should be
the means used to ensure compensation whenever our notions of
fairness require it. The property rights legislation that has been
proposed in Congress and the property rights legislation that
tection to individuals who are peculiarly injured by a regulation because their portfo-
lio is not diversified.
114. See James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). For devel-
opment of this point, see Treanor, supra note 2, at 838-40; William Michael Treanor,
Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 712-13 (1985).
115. See Treanor, supra note 2, at 794 n.69.
116. See id.
117. Tucker Act, ch. 35a, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.).
118. See Shimomura, supra note 104, at 637-66; Treanor, supra note 2, at 794 n.69.
119. See, e.g., Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act.of 1971, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1994). For discussion, see Note, Condemnations,
Implicit Benefits, and .Collective Losses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 696, 707 (1994) (stating
that the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of
1971 provides for compensation that courts would not order).
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has been enacted in the states, however, go beyond the limited
realm in which consensus exists about what fairness requires.
Statutes typically require compensation whenever property val-
ues drop beyond a certain level. 2 ' As critiques of the property
rights movement critiques indicate, 2' however, our cultural
consensus is more limited. That consensus is not that any dimi-
nution of value is unfair; it is, rather, that a heavy and unantici-
pated burden on an individual property owner with limited as-
sets is unfair.
PROPOSAL
The problem thus becomes how to craft a compensation stat-
ute in a way that allows for case-by-case resolution. This might
seem to be an insolvable problem. Case-by-case resolution sug-
gests a judicial, not a legislative, solution. There is, however, an
answer: legislatures (including Congress) can empower courts to
provide compensation above the constitutional minimum on a
case-by-case basis. A model is provided by the one state statute
that does not use a mere threshold test as a basis for requiring
compensation: Florida's Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property
Rights Protection Act. 2 That statute provides that compensa-
tion is due whenever a regulation places an "inordinate burden"
on the landowner's use of her property. 2' Courts are thus em-
powered to use a flexible standard in evaluating individual cir-
cumstances. A property owner is "inordinately burdened" if she
is "permanently unable to attain.., reasonable, investment-
backed expectation" or is "left with existing or vested uses that
are unreasonable such that the property owner bears perma-
nently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good
of the public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at
large." 4 Thus, the test used tracks, in part, the Armstrong
120. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. Some statutes apply to all regu-
lations; others to enumerated regulatory schemes. See id.
121. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 10 (criticizing congressional property rights
proposals); Property Wrongs, supra note 14 (attacking the rationale underlying prop-
erty rights legislation).
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp. 1996).
123. See id. § 70.001(3)(e).
124. Id.
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principle.
This statutory test allows courts to focus on the way in which
a regulation affects a particular piece of property. Thus, in a
case in which a certain agricultural use was banned, compensa-
tion might be due if the affected land was a farm, but not if it
was undeveloped, even if both properties suffered the same per-
centage diminution in value. The legislation seems to have been
motivated by a desire to be more protective of property interests
than a threshold test would allow; the underlying idea is that
some people are so burdened by regulations that they deserve
compensation, even if their loss failed to cross some specified
threshold.'
Even if the Florida statute reflects the antiregulatory bias of
the property rights movement, the flexible standard and the no-
tion of disproportionate burden employed by the statute are
worth emulation. Following that model, an appropriate compen-
sation statute might direct a court to award compensation in sit-
uations in which it found that the property owner bore an unfair
burden in light of the effect of the regulation on her total assets,
including assets other than the affected property, and in light of
the foreseeability of the regulation. Such a statute, unlike the
Florida statute, would focus on actual harm to the property own-
er, rather than the particular harm to the property. More to the
point, given the limited nature of the consensus about unfair-
ness, such a compensation statute should make clear that com-
pensation above the constitutional mandate should be limited to
exceptional cases, the kinds of cases that provide the property
rights movement with its horror stories.
The type of compensation statute argued for here would not
alter takings law radically. It would allow courts to provide com-
pensation in a small class of cases not compensable under cur-
rent standards, situations in which the harm to the individual is
disproportionate even though the harm to the affected property is
not of such a magnitude as to trigger a compensation require-
ment under current takings law. Although courts would actually
125. See Recent Legislation, supra note 12, at 544-47; David L. Powell et al.,
Florida's New Law to Protect Private Property Rights, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1995, at 13. I
thank my colleague David Schmudde for calling to my attention the latter article.
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award more compensation under such a statute than they grant
currently, those awards would not violate a proper understand-
ing of the Takings Clause because they would be the product of a
legislative mandate, not judicial construction of the Constitution.
Such an approach admittedly suffers from the same problem
from which any flexible standard suffers. Neither policymaker
nor property owner will know with certainty whether a particu-
lar regulation as applied to a particular piece of land will run
afoul of the statute, although,. as courts apply the statute, a body
of case law will evolve to minimize the uncertainty. As a result,
policymakers will thus tend to underregulate while property
owners sometimes will incur substantial litigation costs before
being able to vindicate their claims.12 This problem will be
limited because compensation will be mandated only in the ex-
ceptional case.
More importantly, such a statute would strike a balance more
reflective of our societal norms than either the property rights
movement's compensation statutes or current case law. As I
have argued, it is widely felt that some people bear much more
than their due share of the regulating burden and thus deserve
compensation.127 At the same time, the opposition to the prop-
erty rights movement suggests that the movement's
antiregulatory attitude has only limited support. The compen-
sation statute argued for here strikes an appropriate balance,
providing compensation to those people generally believed to be
bearing too much of the public burdens, but without making the
end of the regulatory state the cost of compensation.
126. For such a critique of the Harris Act, see Recent Legislation, supra note 12, at
544-47.
127. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
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